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Abstract  
Despite its strong theoretical position when it comes to explaining inflation in transition economies, the 
empirical merits of the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect are weak. This paper points to three theory-based 
contributing factors to these weak findings and offers an alternative approach. First, the short-term focus 
makes B-S prone to underestimating the magnitude of the productivity growth differential. Second, the 
conventional demand side CPI based sectoral composition reduces the extent to which the productivity 
growth differential is passed through to inflation. Third, by ignoring the dependence between the two main 
B-S components, a second downward bias to the productivity growth pass through comes about. The key to 
our proposed alternative centres around an endogenous relation between the productivity growth differential 
and sector sizes. The long-run supply-side approach allows us to capture inflation drivers that conventional 
B-S fails to incorporate.  The paper provides a blueprint for future empirical analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite its strong theoretical position when it comes to explaining inflation and real exchange rate 
developments in transition economies, the empirical merits of the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect are weak.1 
In fact, over the last years several papers have claimed the B-S effect irrelevant for the difficulties transition 
economies in eastern-Europe have encountered in complying with the Maastricht inflation criterion.2
                                                                                                                                           
  
Irrespective of weak empirical estimates, the role of structural inflation should not be taken lightly. 
Countries transitioning from centrally planned economies to market economies experience large structural 
changes in compressed time. Common sense suggests that structural shifts of such magnitude will be 
accompanied by inflation originating in structural causes. If there is anywhere a showcase for structural 
inflation it should be found in this type of economy.  For decades economists have been attracted by these 
features, trying to highlight causal relations between the epochal structural shifts and inflation – in particular 
along the lines of B-S.3
   
 
However, questions regarding how the B-S effect typically is analyzed seem to remain. 
The purpose of this paper is first of all to identify some of the theory-based reasons for why the empirical 
support for structural inflation, as manifested by the B-S effect, has been so disappointing.  Second, the paper 
proposes an alternative conceptual approach. The paper essentially argues that the reason why we still have 
not found what we are looking for is that we have been looking in the wrong places. 
 
The literature on the B-S effect, as described by for example Égert (2002a), concern itself with how 
productivity growth in the tradable sector outpaces that of the non-tradable sector. Under the assumption that 
wage growth is roughly equal between sectors, wages increase in both sectors. As a consequence the relative 
price of non-tradable goods rises, and inflation picks up. This way the theory establishes a causal relation 
between sectoral productivity growth and structural inflation. 
 
The B-S analysis has gone through a number of variations and extensions. The original supply side 
orientation by Balassa and Samuelson4 has been extended to include demand side variables, such as per 
capita income and government expenditures.5
                                                          
1 For example, for a selection of East European economies Mihaljek and Klau (2008) show, on average, the short run ‘domestic B-S 
effect’ to be 0.13%, the long run ‘domestic B-S effect’ 1.1%, the short run ‘international B-S effect’ 0.1%, and the long run 
‘international B-S effect 1.2%. Mihaljek and Klau (2004) report  that the B-S effect, in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, on 
average only explains between 0.2 % and 2 % of the annual inflation differentials relative to the euro area.  Small effects are also 
reported, for example, Cipriani (2000), Coricelli & Jazbec (2001), Égert (2002a), Égert (2002b), Égert et al (2003), Flek et al (2003), 
and Kovács (2002).  
 Recent applications also distinguish between a so-called 
internal (or domestic) B-S effect and an external (or international) one. Both versions of the B-S effect are 
2  For example, Égert (2005) concludes that the B-S effect plays o2 For example, for a selection of East European economies 
Mihaljek and Klau (2008) show, on average, the short run ‘domestic B-S effect’ to be 0.13%, the long run ‘domestic B-S effect’ 
1.1%, the short run ‘international B-S effect’ 0.1%, and the long run ‘international B-S effect 1.2%. Mihaljek and Klau (2004) report  
that the B-S effect, in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, on average only explains between 0.2 % and 2 % of the annual 
inflation differentials relative to the euro area.  Small effects are also reported, for example, Cipriani (2000), Coricelli & Jazbec 
(2001), Égert (2002a), Égert (2002b), Égert et al (2003), Flek et al (2003), and Kovács (2002).  
nly a very limited role in the determination of inflation and real exchange rate movements. Breuss (2003) concludes that the B-S 
effect is no obstacle for the east European euro area aspirants. Furthermore, the hypothesis that structural factors related to changes in 
productivity are NOT significant inflation drivers in transition economies has prompted a search for other causal relations germain to 
the transition experience. For example Égert and Podpiera (2008) advance an alternative explanation in their ‘quality bias 
hypothesis’.  
3  For a review of the literature on the B-S effect, see for example, Égert (2003) or Égert et al (2006). 
4 See Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). See also Rogoff (1996) or Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996) for a description of the ‘original’ 
supply side perspective of B-S analysis. 
5 For B-S analysis extended to include the demand side, see Bergstrand (1991) or De Gregorio et al. (1994) 
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hypotheses about structural causes of inflation. The international version focuses on the tendency for 
inflation in catching-up economies to exceed that of the economies they are converging to. In the domestic 
version The B-S effect represents the tendency for the domestic prices of non-tradable goods to rise faster 
than the prices of tradables (Mihaljek and Klau, 2008).  
In this paper we argue that B-S analysis is beset by three unfortunate features that prevent it from 
capturing that which it is seeking. These features reside on the theoretical side. First, although usually 
thought of as a supply side model, closer examination of its typical formulation reveals a clear demand side 
channel. Second, and more importantly, structural changes evolve over the longer term. However, by 
construction, B-S has a short-term orientation. Third, the B-S effect treats as independent what in reality are 
strongly related elements:  the productivity growth differential between sectors and the sectors relative 
magnitude.    
Taking these shortcomings into account suggests a blueprint for an alternative approach when 
estimating structural inflation and the B-S effect. This entails a re-focusing on the supply side, the longer 
term and on the interdependence between the two main factors determining how structural shifts impact on 
inflation. This interdependence allows contemporaneous-, as well as leading- and lagging values of the 
productivity growth differential to impact on sector sizes, and, eventually structural inflation. In the absence 
of leading- or lagging relations between the productivity growth differential and sector sizes, our approach 
reduces to the conventional B-S approach.  
 The long-run perspective implies that we abstract from (often erratic) year-on-year changes of 
structural inflation drivers, in favor of cumulative changes and their annual averages, in line with the long-
term processes underlying transition. Structural inflation can now vary both over time and between countries 
at different stages of transition for two reasons:  changes in the productivity growth differential, and changes 
in how the differential is passed through to inflation. In particular, by endogenising relative sector sizes, we 
can assess how the impact of the productivity growth pass-through on structural inflation changes over time.    
In this context it is useful to regard the B-S effect as a component of a more general variant of the 
structural inflation hypothesis - decidedly anchored in the supply side and decidedly long-term - that has 
become known as the Scandinavian Model of Inflation.6
Structural inflation is the contribution to inflation from the real side of the economy. As the real 
factors are related to the structural shifts at the heart of the transition process they hold a promise of future 
growth and higher standard of living. Structural inflation should thus be less worrisome to policy makers 
than the nominal (monetary) contribution to inflation. Yet, the Maastricht Convergence Criterion on 
inflation, which has been a barrier to euro zone entry for a number of East European EU member states, does 
not distinguish between real and nominal contributions to inflation. Considering that the East European new 
EU member states still have a long way to go to be at par with the standard of living of West European 
economies and their economic structures, it is to be expected that structural inflation will persist into the 
foreseeable future.  
  
If structural inflation accounts for a significant portion of overall inflation, and is expected to persist, 
it puts a question mark over the appropriateness of the Maastricht convergence criteria for transition 
economies aspiring to join the euro area. In this context the magnitude of the structural component to overall 
inflation is significant for policymakers. So far, traditional B-S analysis with its weak empirical support has 
backed up West European policy-makers’ opinions that special considerations for transition economies are 
not warranted.7
                                                          
6 See Lindbeck (1979) for an exposition of the Scandinavian Model of Inflation. 
 In this paper we present analytical foundations for a potential reconsideration of this opinion. 
7 The official stance of the European Commission and the European Central bank, expressed in 2001 as follows, has essentially not 
changed: “…notwithstanding its importance, the Balassa-Samuelson effect should not be overstated when explaining current 
inflation rates in the accession countries…. The Maastricht inflation criterion, which will not be revised to take into account any 
possible Balassa-Samuelson effect, should not be seen as an immediate requirement for these countries, but rather as a medium-term 
objective for central banks.” (Christian Noyer, 2001) 
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The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we document the distinction between short- and 
long-term measures of B-S and structural inflation, and pinpoint the shortcomings of the former. A long-term 
supply side focused approach for structural inflation based on the Scandinavian Model of Inflation is derived 
in Section 3. The model endogenises the relationship between sector sizes and the productivity growth 
differential, the two main components of the B-S effect, and highlights the distinction between short- and 
long-run measures. The implications for transition are developed in Section 4. The relationship between the 
productivity growth pass-through and its underlying causes is discussed in Section 5. The last part 
concludes.       
 
2.  Conceptual considerations: Structural inflation and Balassa-Samuelson  
When the empirical findings of the B-S effect are declared to be weak two types of attitudes may be 
conveyed. One perspective is that the B-S effect is weak because structural inflation drivers are weak, and 
that - like it or not - this is simply what the data tells us (Égert and Podpiera, 2008). The other perspective is 
that the data harbors strong evidence of structural inflation drivers, but the conventional B-S methodology 
fails to capture it. It is this latter perspective that we pursue in this section. The core of our argument is that 
long-run supply side transition dynamics come in two layers, which in the following is referred to as 
reallocation and restructuring, terms which are to be defined later. The paper argues that the conventional B-
S effect captures the former, but not the latter. 
 In the short-term the relative sizes of the tradable and the non-tradable sector (key elements in B-S 
analysis) are fixed. Profit-seeking behavior is confined to finding improvements in factor proportions, to 
increase productivity, product quality, improve work organization and managerial practices, and other 
activities compatible with fixed relative sector sizes. Economic expansion or decline would affect all sectors 
simultaneously. The economy may grow or shrink, but relative sector shares remain unchanged. Blanchard 
(1997), for example, points out that the stark shrinkage of output in the very beginning of transition was 
distributed evenly across all sectors. This would fit within our frame of reference of fixed relative sector 
shares. The accompanying impact on inflation is a short-term effect.  
However, Blanchard (1997) continues with “…over time, there has been increasing differentiation 
across sectors, and there now appears to be slow convergence of sectoral composition to that observed in 
OECD countries”.8
In this frame of reference we define transition as a shift toward a larger share of the non-tradable 
sector - essentially in agreement with Blanchard (1997). Viewed from this perspective the structural shifts at 
the very heart of transition essentially remain outside the conventional B-S analysis. This may be an obvious 
reason for its weak empirical results. Another potential cause is that relative sector sizes are typically defined 
as shares in the CPI rather than in GDP.  
  This describes what is meant by long-term or large scale dynamics: Changes in relative 
sector sizes through reallocation or restructuring processes. We will refer to the effects of changing relative 
sector sizes on inflation as long-term effects. 
We will address these potential reasons for the weak B-S effect one by one, and in more detail 
below. Let us take as a point of departure the definition of structural inflation ( )STRP  as suggested by the 
Scandinavian Model of Inflation, which is in congruence with B-S methodology9
1)                            
  
[ ]( )NTTSTR qqP  −−= )1( α        
where (1-α) denotes the relative size of the non-tradable sector and [ ]NTT qq  −  the productivity growth 
differential between the tradable and non-tradable sector.  The original structural inflation hypothesis does 
                                                          
8 Blanchard (1997), pp. 5.  
9 See again Lindbeck (1979) for the Scandinanvian Model of Inflation, and Mihaljek and Klau (2008) for the conventional B-S 
framework.  
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not concern itself with inter-temporal considerations, and is thus, in principle, subject to a variety of 
extensions and interpretations. The two dominant variants are: 
(i) Fixed relative size of the non-tradable sector pre-multiplying a sum of time-indexed 
productivity growth differentials10
2a) (1−α)
  
∑
=
T
tj
( ) jNTT qq  −         
(ii)  Alternatively, the products of time-indexed productivity growth differentials and time-
indexed relative size of the non-tradable sector summed over the relevant time horizon. Note 
that here contemporaneous non-tradable sector size and contemporaneous productivity 
growth differentials are the factors of the products, i.e. ( )α−1  and ( )NTT qq  −  have always 
the same time index. 11
2b) 
 
( )∑
=
−
T
tj
jα1 ( ) jNTT qq  −        
Expressions (2a) and (2b) are interpreted as structural inflation over a period of time, i.e. the part of inflation 
that has its origin in the real side of the economy, as opposed to the monetary side. To obtain average annual 
values of structural inflation expression (2a) and/or (2b) are divided by the number of years under 
observation.   
Three comments are in order: (i) As mentioned above, analysis of the B-S effect typically computes 
the relative size of the non-tradable sector, (1−α), by taking the sector’s share in the CPI rather than its share 
in GDP. This, while analytically not incorrect, has been shown to underestimate the sector’s size, and, by 
implication, underestimate the B-S effect. This is particularly so for the transition economies of Eastern 
Europe. For example, as Mihaljek and Klau (2008) point out, market-based non-tradables are responsible for 
only around 20%-30% of the Baltic States’ CPI basket, while typically contributing more than 60% to valued 
added. This implies that switching from CPI to GDP when calculating the size of the non-tradable sector will 
augment the B-S effect. Even so, CPI-based (i.e. demand side) sectoral share computations are doubtful 
when explaining structural inflation.  
(ii) Standard B-S analysis takes the size of the non-tradable sector (1−α) and the productivity growth 
differences between tradable and non-tradable sectors ( )NTT qq  −  as independent of each other. A 
dependency relation is however argued by Borgersen and King (2009). In particular, relative sector sizes are 
argued to depend on the productivity growth differential between sectors. So, if for example productivity 
growth in the tradable sector is stronger than in the non-tradable sector the tradable sector will expand 
relative to the non-tradable sector.  
(iii) Accepting a dependence relation, as described in (ii), and defining relative sector size as a 
function of productivity growth differences, de facto rules out expression (2a) since here the sector size 
(1−α) is constant, as indicated by the absence of a time index.   
In contrast to (2a), expression (2b) accommodates a dependence of the relative sector size (1 −α) on 
the productivity growth difference ( )NTT qq  − . However, a new question arises: Why should sector size at 
time t depend only on productivity growth differential at time t? Would it not be more plausible that sector 
size at time t also depends on productivity growth in earlier years?  After all, it will take time to change 
sector sizes in response to productivity growth signals.  And further, is not plausible that sector sizes depend 
                                                          
10 The majority of papers dealing with the B-S effect are of this kind, as a review of the survey papers Égert, Balázs (2003), and/or 
Égert et al. (2006) reveals. 
11 For example Mihaljek and Klau (2008) take this approach. 
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on expectations about future productivity growth? Such expectations could, for example be raised by 
announcements of economic policy that favors a particular sector. This would attract entrepreneurial activity 
and investment into this sector even before such policy is enacted, in order to secure a ‘first move 
advantage’. In other words, should we not consider both leads and lags in the relationship between the 
productivity growth differential and sector sizes? This also fits nicely with the long-term orientation of the 
Scandinavian Model of Inflation and its strong anchoring in the supply side.  
The mathematical expression analogous to (2b), but in contrast to (2b), capturing leads and lags in 
the above sense is given by12
3) 
  
( ) ( )∑∑
==
−−
T
ti
iNTT
T
tj
j qq α1
      
 
We present expression (3) as an alternative formulation of structural inflation, and refer to it as 
cumulative structural inflation. As before, average annual values of cumulative structural inflation are 
obtained by dividing the expression by the number of years under observation. In the following we refer to 
expression 3) as the long-run B-S effect. 
As shown in Borgersen and King (2009) for the case of Latvia, in a simple accounting framework, an 
analysis along the lines of cumulative structural inflation assigns a strong role to structural factors impacting 
on inflation. In standard B-S analysis erratic year-on-year jumps between advances in productivity of the 
tradable sector alternating with advances in productivity in the non-tradable sector make these manifestations 
of short- term supply side factors effectively cancelling each other out, – giving the misleading impression 
that structural factors exert only a weak influence on inflation. Defining structural inflation according to 
equation (3) mitigates these mutually cancelling effects, and contributes to a stronger impact of structural 
inflation drivers.  
Furthermore, expression (3) incorporates leads and lags in the relation between the relative size of 
the sectors and the productivity growth differential ( )NTT qq  − . Structural shifts depend on an array of past, 
current and expected future productivity growth differentials, acting as signals for profit seeking investors. In 
addition to the current productivity growth differential, investments are motivated by expectations of 
upcoming productivity growth in a sector (leads), and past productivity growth differentials which might 
have lagging effects on investments and sector sizes.     
So, using expression (3) serves a dual purpose: First, it mitigates the ‘cancelling out effect’ of year-
on-year reversals in productivity growth differentials between tradable and non-tradable sector. Second, and 
more significantly, equation (3) captures something that is missed by standard B-S analysis: The longer term 
structural shifts at the heart of transition that bring about changes in sectoral composition. For illustrative 
purposes we expand expression (3), and arrange its terms in matrix form.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Note that while expression (2b) is a sum of products, expression (3) is a product of sums. 
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Table 1:  Productivity growth differentials and sector size 
(1-α)t( NTqTq  − )t (1-α)t( NTqTq  − )t+1 (1-α)t( NTqTq  − )t+2 . . (1-α)t( NTqTq  − )T-1 (1-α)t( NTqTq  − )T 
(1- α)t+1( NTqTq  − )t (1-α)t+1( NTqTq  − )t+1 (1-α)t+1( NTqTq  − )t+2 . . (1-α)t+1( NTqTq  − )T-1 (1-α)t+1( NTqTq  − )T 
(1- α)t+2( NTqTq  − )t (1-α)t+2( NTqTq  − )t+1  (1-α)t+2( NTqTq  − )t+2 . . (1-α)t+2( NTqTq  − )T-1 (1-α)t+2( NTqTq  − )T 
(1- α)t+3( NTqTq  − )t (1-α)t+3( NTqTq  − )t+1 (1-α)t+3( NTqTq  − )t+2 . 
. 
 (1-α)t+3( NTqTq  − )T-1 (1-α)t+3( NTqTq  − )T 
           . 
           . 
         . 
           . 
           . 
           . 
              . 
 . 
 . 
 . 
. 
. 
             . 
. 
. 
             . 
             . 
             . 
(1- α)T-1( NTqTq  − )t (1-α)T-1( NTqTq  − )t+1 (1-α)T-1( NTqTq  − )t+2   (1-α)T-1( NTqTq  − )T-1      (1-α)T-1( NTqTq  − )T     
(1- α)T( NTqTq  − )t (1-α)T( NTqTq  − )t+1 (1-α)T( NTqTq  − )t+2   (1-α)T( NTqTq  − )T-1  (1-α)T( NTqTq  − )T      
 
Note that expression (2a) represents one fixed but arbitrary row of the matrix, while expression (2b) 
represents its principal diagonal (indicated by the shaded cells in the matrix). By contrast, expression (3) 
represents the entire matrix.  The distinction between counting the diagonal, or one of the rows, and the full 
matrix illustrates the distinction between the short- and the long-term B-S approach.  
Table 1 will be useful when in Section 5 we analyze how structural inflation drivers evolve. In 
particular, for visualizing how leading and lagging productivity growth differentials might impact on 
structural inflation.13
4a)  
 The terms to the left of the (shaded) principal diagonal lend themselves to the 
interpretation of lags in the above described sense. These are the terms of a sub-sum of (3), given by  
( ) ( )∑∑
−
=+=
−−
1
1
1
T
ti
iNTT
T
tj
j qq α , 
while the terms to the right of the principal diagonal are interpreted as leads, and are represented by a sub-
sum of (3) given by  
4b)                     ( ) ( )∑∑
+=
−
=
−−
T
ti
iNTT
T
tj
j qq
1
1
1 α  
 
3. A long-run supply side approach to structural Inflation  
The Scandinavian Model of Inflation incorporates the Balassa-Samuelson effect into a comprehensive long-
run framework, where wage growth is equalized between sectors allowing the productivity growth 
                                                          
13 In an econometric analysis the weights assigned to the various matrix elements in computing the value of expression (3) for a given 
dataset are estimated, i.e. would be endogenous to the model.  
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differential to simultaneously impact the tradable and the non-tradable sector. The formation of wages 
is related to the productivity differential between sectors, and hence the B-S effect. The relationship between 
wages and the productivity differential comes about to maintain fixed income shares for both capital and 
labour. In the model, the demand side is implicitly suppressed, highlighting the supply side determinants of 
structural inflation.  
Consider a small open economy, split into a tradable and a non-tradable sector along the lines of 
Lindbeck (1979), where labour and capital are used as inputs in both sectors of production. The two sectors 
differ when it comes to pricing, as purchasing power parity is assumed to govern pricing of tradable goods. 
In the non-tradable sector there is mark-up pricing, as prices are set in relation to unit labour costs. Labour is 
homogenous and factor income shares are fixed. This in basic constrains the model to the long run.  
Expressing all variables as rates of change, the structural approach to inflation reads  
5)                                              [ ]NTTW qqepP  −−++= )1( α  
where )(P  equals the domestic price index, )( wp world market prices and )(e  the exchange rate.  In 
addition, productivity growth in the tradable )( Tq and in the non-tradable sector )( NTq impact inflation, 
where the productivity growth differential is scaled down by the size of the non-tradable sector, ( )α−1 , 
measuring the share of aggregate output of the non-tradable sector. In equation 5) the last term represents 
structural inflation, i.e. [ ]NTTSTR qqP  −−= )1( α , as already introduced in equation 1.  
This representation of structural inflation is common to both conventional B-S analysis and the 
Scandinavian Model of Inflation.  For highlighting the distinction between conventional B-S analysis, and 
our extended version of the Scandinavian Model of Inflation, let us consider the impact on structural 
inflation of an increase in the productivity growth differential.  
As it is only the difference in productivity growth between sectors that matters, we simplify the 
exposition by assuming that productivity growth in the non-tradable sector is zero ( )0=NTq ). This makes 
the productivity growth differential equal to productivity growth in the tradable sector. Let us also assume 
that sector sizes are fixed in the short-run, motivated by the discussion in section 2. Now, the short-run 
productivity growth pass-through equals  
7)                                                                     0)1( >−= α
T
STR
qd
Pd


 
The short-run B-S effect is positive when the productivity growth differential increases. The extent 
of productivity growth pass-through is determined by the size of the non-tradable sector.  
However, as discussed above, the short-term analysis must be extended when analysing long-term 
shifts. In particular, the fixed sector size assumption must be relaxed.  This is what our extension of the 
Scandinavian Model of Inflation introduces. According to the B-S effect, structural inflation has two 
components: the productivity growth differential and how this productivity growth differential is passed 
through to inflation. Variations in structural inflation can now come from two sources: directly via changes 
in the productivity growth differential, and indirectly through variations in how the productivity growth 
differential is passed-through to inflation. While equation 7) takes into account the former of these two, the 
latter is ignored. By endogenising sector sizes, variations in productivity growth pass-through are also 
accounted for. 
Thinking of sector sizes as a consequence of productivity growth differentials motivates our 
extension of the Scandinavian Model of Inflation: to define the relative size of the tradable sector as an 
increasing function of the productivity growth differential.14
                                                          
14 It is assumed that 
    
( )  Tt qαα = is continuous and differentiable. 
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8)                                      ( ) 0)(     where ' >= TTt qq  ααα  
The positive relationship between the productivity growth differential and the tradable sector implies 
a negative relationship between the productivity growth differential and the non-tradable sector. This defines 
an inverse relationship between the productivity growth differential and the productivity growth pass-
through. Hence, even if the productivity growth differential decreases, structural inflation can still increase. 
This as long as the sector size response is substantial, and the increase in productivity growth pass-through 
more than outweighs the reduction in the productivity growth differential. Hence, the long-run approach adds 
complexity to the analysis of structural inflation and the B-S effect.      
The combined effect on structural inflation when sector sizes are endogenous is analysed by 
Borgersen and King (2009), distinguishing between a productivity effect (PE) and a size effect (SE).  
Whereas the former incorporates the direct effect on structural inflation from the productivity growth 
differential, the latter captures the indirect effect following the sector size response and the changing 
productivity growth pass-through.15
9)                
 The combined effect on structural inflation is:     

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Figure 1 gives a schematic relationship between a number of different productivity measures in the 
tradable sector and the sector size. The size of the tradable sector is measured on the horizontal axis, while 
the vertical axis measures tradable sector productivity.  The graph shows the relation between the two, and 
illustrates the relationship between the size of the tradable sector and the productivity growth information set 
(highlighted below the first axes).  
Figure 1: The relationship between the size of the tradable sector and its productivity measures 
 
                                                          
15 See Borgersen and King (2009) for comparative statics.  
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The interpretation of figure 1 can briefly be described as follows:  When productivity is at its peak, 
the tradable sector is close to full resource utilization. When the tradable sector is smaller than its optimal 
size (for instance in regime ii), the positive productivity growth will make the sector expand. When tradable 
sector size is above its optimal value, the negative productivity growth prompts a contraction. In the regimes 
II and III, where the acceleration of tradable sector productivity growth decreases, the size of the tradable 
sector adjust towards full capital utilisation. In regime II, where the tradable sector increases (and the non-
tradable sector decreases), the increase in the productivity growth differential stimulating structural inflation, 
is counteracted by the reduction in productivity growth pass- through. In regime iii on the other hand, where 
the tradable sector decreases, the reduction in the productivity growth differential is accompanied by an 
increase in the non-tradable sector, i.e. in the productivity growth pass-through.  
The endogenous sector size allows us to address the combined impact on structural inflation 
following an increased productivity growth differential, which can be either positive or negative. By 
manipulating equation 9) the conditions for when 0>
T
STR
qd
Pd


can be expressed as:   
10a)                                                             
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TqEl               when      ( )0<Tq  
10b)                                                            
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is the sector size elasticity, measuring how the distribution of value added 
between sectors is affected by a one percent increase in the productivity growth differential. The conditions 
for when an increased productivity growth differential increases structural inflation, depends on the 
relationship between the sector size elasticity and the prevailing distribution of value added, but varies 
according to acceleration of the productivity growth differential.     
In the centre of figure 1, structural inflation will increase if the sector size elasticity exceeds the 
existing distribution of value added.16
When comparing the short-run B-S analysis to our long-run B-S approach, some interesting 
observations come about: While in the short-run framework the conditions for inflationary pressure is only 
exerted in regimes I and II of figure 1 (see equation 7), it can be associated with all four regimes in the long-
run (see equations 10a and 10b). This illustrates why the short-run B-S approach might understate the B-S 
effect, being susceptible to erratic year-on-year productivity growth differentials between sectors. The 
endogenous productivity growth pass-through gives a more differentiated understanding of how productivity 
growth differentials impact on structural inflation.  That is, although the short-run B-S effect is negative the 
long-run B-S effect can still be positive.  
 In the wings, the sector size elasticity has to be smaller than the 
prevailing distribution of value added for structural inflation to increase. Stated differently, in the centre a 
higher productivity growth differential will increase structural inflation when the size effect exceeds the 
productivity effect. When the sector size elasticity exceeds the existing distribution of value added, the 
higher productivity growth pass-through will compensate for the reduced productivity growth differential. In 
the wings on the other hand, where the sector size elasticity is smaller than the prevailing distribution of 
value added, the reduced pass-through has to be accompanied by an increased productivity growth 
differential for structural inflation to increase.   
   
 
                                                          
16 The conditions for when structural inflation decreases are given by conditions (10a) and (10b), but now the inequalities are 
reversed. 
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4. Reallocation and restructuring  
While the short-term B-S effect is associated with fixed sector sizes, the long-run approach in Section 3 
allows for changes in sector sizes, but keeps the optimal distribution of value added fixed.  According to the 
reasoning in Section 2, about the different version of structural inflation applied in the B-S analysis, the 
short-run B-S effect where sector sizes are fixed is represented by expression (2a). Likewise, expression 
(2b), allowing for changes in sector sizes, can be associated with our long-run B-S effect above. Still, the 
reasoning regarding structural inflation should also allow for potential shifts in the optimal distribution of 
value added. Transition is, as highlighted by Blanchard (1997)and described earlier, associated with changes 
in the optimal distribution of value added between sectors over time. More specific, transition is defined as a 
relative decrease (increase) in the tradable (non-tradable) sectors optimal share of valued added as the 
economy matures. Hence, in addition to the reallocation effect captured by equation (2b), we also allow for a 
more fundamental structural shift, referred to as restructuring. These latter shifts are associated with changes 
in optimal sector sizes. While reallocation implies movements along one particular curve in figure 2 below, 
restructuring encompasses shifts to another of the family of curves.  
Both reallocation and restructuring are related to changes in the productivity growth differential.  
That is, increased productivity in a sector increases profits and rents, which act as a signal for shifting of 
resources into the sector, through changes in relative prices. However, while reallocation is characterised by 
expansions - or contractions - of resources highly sensitive to the current productivity growth differential, the 
shifting of resources accompanying restructuring requires something more than just instantaneous stimulus. 
It depends on the underlying momentum in the productivity growth differential, incorporating both current-, 
past-, and expected future productivity growth differentials. Hence, restructuring is related to the measure of 
structural inflation given by expression 3.  
Figure 2 shows two of a family of curves, which in their entirety trace out a country’s transition 
trajectory, including both reallocation and restructuring. As transition is defined as changes in the 
distribution of value added towards the non tradable sector, the closer to the origin a curve is located, the 
more mature the economy. The dynamics of restructuring are linked to reallocation. Consider an economy 
initially at point B (equivalent with regime iii in figure 1), where resources are not optimised, given the 
optimal distribution of value added ( )*2α . Assuming that condition 10a) holds structural inflation increases.   
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Figure 2: Reallocation and restructuring. The productivity information set is related to ( )2α   
 
At point B the deflationary impact on structural inflation accompanying the negative productivity 
growth differential is dominated by the increased productivity growth pass-through. When the economy 
moves from point B towards point A, structural inflation increases.  As the reallocation process moves the 
economy towards point A, the )( 2α curve “flattens out”. Once the sector size elasticity approaches the 
prevailing distribution of value added, the productivity growth differential becomes incapable of inducing 
further volume responses. Additional reallocations can now no longer translate into productivity gains. The 
reallocation process is characterised by a negative productivity growth differential, which stimulates the non-
tradable sector. Contrary to the falling productivity growth differential, the rising productivity growth pass-
through stimulates inflation. At point A the productivity growth differential approaches zero, and the 
productivity growth pass-through dominates the impact on structural inflation. The increased impact of the 
productivity growth pass-through builds up cumulative structural inflation. When structural inflation 
increases, and (eventually) reaches a critical value K, it challenges the existing optimal sector structure. Now 
restructuring changes the optimal sector sizes, i.e. there is a shift from )( *2α  to )(
*
1α , and the economy jumps 
from point A to point C, where a new process of reallocation starts over.      
The condition for shifting between curves, illustrating restructuring, can, where )( CTq represents the 
cumulative average productivity growth differential, and ( )*αˆ denotes a fixed but arbitrary ( )*α , be denoted 
as follows:   
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When the cumulative average productivity growth differential makes structural inflation exceed a 
given threshold (K), the optimal distribution of value added changes. Restructuring comes about when the 
tα
Tq
Tq
Tq
0> 0>
0> 0>0< 0<
0<0<
*
2α  
*
1α  
2α  
1α  
A 
B 
C 
 
 
13 
 
benefits from reallocation have been exhausted. The condition for restructuring and transition can 
alternatively, when applying equation 10a), be expressed as:  
12)                               K
qd
Pd
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STR ≥

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   that is when  
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T q
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               ( )0≥K  
That is, when the sector size elasticity exceeds a threshold defined by the existing distribution of 
value added, adjusted for the K-component, restructuring comes about.   
The analysis points to two interlinked phases of transition, both related to productivity growth 
developments in the tradable and in the non-tradable sector. This lends itself to the interpretation that 
reallocation is associated with medium-term processes, restructuring describes longer-term developments. 
When the reallocation gains have been exhausted the energies from the productivity growth differential 
emerge as an accelerator of structural inflation. When structural inflation reaches an intensity level K, the 
reallocation process eventually stimulates the restructuring dynamics.       
 
5. Structural inflation drivers 
Given the discussion in section 2 we allow for an interpretation of K in order to discuss how 
structural inflation drivers might vary over time and between countries at different stages of transition. Let us 
start out by endogenising K, and assume that it can be represented as a function (g) of the long run B-S 
effect, that is the cumulative productivity growth differential 
13)                                            
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The conditions for long-term transition is then related to the difference between the sector size 
elasticity, the existing distribution of value added between sectors,  and K, measuring the underlying trend in 
the productivity growth differential.  For considering the extreme cases regarding the relationship between 
the productivity growth differential and transition let us assume that the g-function takes the following form:  
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That is the full matrix minus the principal diagonal, or stated differently the cumulative structural 
inflation less the year-on-year derived structural inflation. When excluding K<0, three possible cases 
emerge:    
Case 1: First, in the absence of lead- and lag effects between structural inflation and the productivity 
growth differential K=0, and the condition for transition will equal condition (8a). In this case our long run 
B-S measure of structural inflation and that of the conventional B-S analysis (short-term B-S) coincide.          
Case  2: If on the other hand K>0, the conditions for long-term transition are harder to satisfy. That 
is, not under all circumstances is structural inflation associated with long-term transition. If we consider an 
established transition economy, one where transition from a planned to a market led economy is well under 
way, and the productivity growth differential for a long period of time has been favourable for transition, 
then the lag effect between past productivity growth differentials and structural inflation is strong. If 
expectations of continued future transition suddenly vanish the K function would only consist of the terms to 
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the left of the principal diagonal. Structural inflation is now completely driven by the lag-effect, and the K-
function equals     
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Case 3:  If K>0 and we consider an economy in its initial phases of transition where the government 
announces a policy shift, emphasising transition and boosting expectations about future productivity growth 
developments, K would only consist of the terms to the right of the principal diagonal, that is      
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All in all, the condition for when structural inflation will be high enough to generate transition varies 
both between countries and over periods. The three cases outlined above are extremes, in the sense that they 
display pure lead- or pure lag effects between the productivity growth differential and structural inflation, or 
complete absence of such effects. In reality these extreme cases are unlikely to be observed, as a mix of both 
lead and lags can be expected. Applying econometric tools to country data could assign weights to the cells 
in the matrix and allow us to classify countries according to their stage on the transition trajectory. Anyhow, 
context specific analyses are necessary to predict which rate of structural inflation that will induce long-term 
transition.     
   
6. Summary and discussion 
This paper questions the conventional framework for analyzing structural inflation and the B-S effect, and 
suggests an alternative based on an extension to the Scandinavian Model of Inflation. The theoretical 
foundations of the B-S effect are addressed, leaving empirical applications for future research.  
In comparison to conventional B-S analysis, the Scandinavian Model of Inflation is more decidedly 
anchored in the supply side, and with a more firm long-term focus. We extend this framework for structural 
inflation by endogenising the relationship between sector sizes and the productivity growth differential, the 
two main components of the B-S model. All in all, this allows us to address three main shortcomings of 
conventional B-S analysis: the demand side channel, the short-term focus, and the lack of dependence 
between the two main factors impacting on structural inflation.      
While typical B-S analysis computes sectoral shares based on CPI (a demand side statistic), a supply 
side emphasis will typically make GDP a preferred choice. In transition economies the CPI based measures 
have been shown to weaken the B-S effect. Focusing on the demand side and downplaying the supply side, 
seems a questionable strategy for analysing structural inflation. Rather, the part of the economy where 
structural factors reside should be the key object of analysis.  
A supply side emphasis immediately leads the way for a long-run perspective, as structural shifts 
residing on the supply side are long-term processes. This perspective implies that not only contemporaneous 
values of the productivity growth differential should be taken into account when analyzing structural 
inflation.  
We introduce the concept of cumulative productivity growth differential as a long-run driver of 
structural inflation and the B-S effect. In our terminology, “counting the entire data-matrix, instead of just its 
principal diagonal, or one of its rows”, comes about as a way of accounting for how productivity growth 
differences between sectors impact on inflation. This allows rather arbitrary values of the year-on-year-
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productivity growth differential- complicating conventional B-S estimates - to be replaced by cumulative 
differentials, better suited for analyzing long-run supply side driven structural shifts.  
The long-run focus also provides additional insights on the B-S effect from the endogenous 
relationship between sector sizes and the productivity growth differential. The lack of dependence between 
the two is shown to hamper short-term B-S analysis. In our long-run  B-S approach a reduced productivity 
growth differential can be compensated by an increased productivity growth pass-through, or vice versa. 
Hence, the long-run B-S approach shows that the link between productivity growth and structural inflation is 
more complex than what the short-term approach leads us to believe.    
Focusing on the cumulative productivity growth differential implies that we allow structural inflation 
and the B-S effect to be influenced by both leads- and lags in the productivity growth differential. While the 
lagging effects can be argued strong in mature transition economies, the leads might be dominant among 
newcomers. The relative strength of the different inflation drivers can be used to classify countries along the 
transition trajectory.  
Augmenting the short-term B-S approach even allows us to separate between different types of 
structural shifts. Both reallocation and restructuring are long-run structural shifts driven by the productivity 
growth differential between sectors. The relation between the two illustrates the complexity of the transition 
process. Restructuring comes about as the reallocation process looses steam, and structural inflation 
escalates. In turn, the shifts brought about by restructuring create new opportunities for reallocation to 
resume.      
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